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Abstract—Deep learning offers state of the art solutions for
image recognition. However, deep models are vulnerable to
adversarial perturbations in images that are subtle but signif-
icantly change the model’s prediction. In a white-box attack,
these perturbations are generally learned for deep models that
operate on RGB images and, hence, the perturbations are equally
distributed in the RGB color space. In this paper, we show
that the adversarial perturbations prevail in the Y-channel of
the YCbCr space. Our finding is motivated from the fact that
the human vision and deep models are more responsive to
shape and texture rather than color. Based on our finding, we
propose a defense against adversarial images. Our defense, coined
ResUpNet, removes perturbations only from the Y-channel by
exploiting ResNet features in an upsampling framework without
the need for a bottleneck. At the final stage, the untouched CbCr-
channels are combined with the refined Y-channel to restore
the clean image. Note that ResUpNet is model agnostic as it
does not modify the DNN structure. ResUpNet is trained end-to-
end in Pytorch and the results are compared to existing defense
techniques in the input transformation category. Our results show
that our approach achieves the best balance between defense
against adversarial attacks such as FGSM, PGD and DDN and
maintaining the original accuracies of VGG-16, ResNet50 and
DenseNet121 on clean images. We perform another experiment
to show that learning adversarial perturbations only for the Y-
channel results in higher fooling rates for the same perturbation
magnitude.
I. INTRODUCTION
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have been
effectively used in a wide range of computer vision tasks [1]
including object detection, image classification, and semantic
segmentation. However, since 2014 [2] an increasing number
of researchers have demonstrated that CNNs are vulnerable to
small perturbations in the input image that form adversarial
examples. As more sophisticated attacks are created [3], there
is a need for more robust models and better defenses [4]. In
terms of defenses, adversarial training [5], [6], architectured
design changes, and input image transformations [7] are
three approaches that are widely used. In the first approach,
adversarial examples are added to the training dataset and the
model is re-trained with this new dataset. As a consequence of
adversarial training, the model becomes more robust against
the used adversarial attack [5]. The second approach is an
active area of research usually involving better architecture
designs or special activation functions to improve robustness
of the model [8]. For the third approach, the image is
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Fig. 1: Comparison between the original and the adversarial images in RGB and YCbCr
color spaces. Adversarial images were created with FGSM attack ( = 0.04). Per channel
`2 distances show that Y-channel values are much higher compared to Cb and Cr whereas
the R, G and B values are similar.
preprocessed, applying different transformations in an attempt
to remove the adversarial patterns in the input [9]. Usually
input transformation defenses are agnostic to the targeted
model and can be applied to any model as opposed to
adversarial training which is specific to individual models.
There are many image transformations that can be used
to remove noise in images [10]. However, some of those
transformations are not able to remove the adversarial patterns
completely. Raff et al. [11] show that random combination
of transformations can help in terms of defense against
adaptative attacks. Nevertheless, application of multiple
transformations also has significant adverse effects on the
model accuracy on clean images.
Previous state-of-the-art defenses in the category of image
preprocessing usually undertake transformations of colored
images in each of the RGB channels of the color space. In
this paper, we explore the effects of common adversarial
attacks and how the perturbation is allocated in different
channels of color spaces such as RGB and YCbCr. The main
contributions of our work are listed below:
1) We show with extensive experiments that adversarial
perturbations are allocated more in the Y-channel of the
YCbCr color space than in the Cb and Cr channels whereas
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2Fig. 2: Up-sampling Architecture: Architecture of Up-sampling model borrowing ResNet features. Those features are passed into the stream of data as a skip connection into the
Upsample Blocks. Residual Blocks and Upsample Blocks internal architectures are shown at the bottom of the diagram. In the first step, input images are converted to YCbCr space
from an RGB image, Cb and Cr channels remain unchanged until the end of the flow when it is concatenated with the restored Y-channel and converted back to an RGB image.
In the case of the Y-channel, random noise is added to it, then passed to a convolutional layer and continues passing through a pipeline of Upsample blocks.
in the RGB color space, the perturbations are equally
distributed between the three channels (See Figure 1).
2) A natural step forward is to develop better defenses that
specialize in removing the adversarial perturbation from
the Y-channel instead of targeting all channels in the RGB
color space. We propose a simple but effective preprocessing
defense that borrows features from an auxiliary network such
as ResNet to compute their own filters in an Up-sampling
Network (Fig. 2). We pass the image through a convolution
layer first, then the up-scaling process starts. Moreover, we
only tackle the recovery of the Y-channel from the YCbCr
color space. We demonstrate that this approach is able to
achieve results comparable to state-of-the-art defenses in the
input transformation methods in regards to PGD attacks,
while obtaining better results on clean images and other
attacks.
3) Given the importance of the Y-channel for adversarial
perturbations, we propose an optimization technique to reduce
the amount of perturbation in existing adversarial attacks such
as FGSM and PGD while achieving higher fooling rates.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Let x ∈ RHxWx3 denote the original image without per-
turbations, where H is height, W is width and there are
three colour channels, usually (R)ed, (G)reen and (B)lue. Let
y ∈ Rn be the probabilities of the predicted labels. Given
an image classifier C → {1, 2, ..., n}, e.g., for an ImageNet
dataset [12] n = 1000, an untargeted attack aims to add a
perturbation p to x to compute xadv , such that C(x) , C(xadv),
where p could be a grayscale image of the same size p ∈
RHxW ; or a colored image of the same size p ∈ RHxWx3.
The calculation xadv = x + p is constrained such that the
perturbation in xadv is imperceptible for the human eye, e.g.,
d(x, xadv) ≤  for a distance function d() and a small value
 . In the context of adversarial attacks, the distance metric
d() is the Lp norm of the difference between the original
image x and the adversarial image xadv . In this paper, we
will consider attacks that optimise the L2 and L∞ norms only.
If the computed xadv satisfies the condition C(x) , C(xadv)
under the given set of constraints, the attack is considered
successful. In addition, let D() denote a defense function; if
C(x) , C(xadv) then D() should ideally behave such that
C(D(xadv)) = C(x).
III. RELATED WORK
Below, we present review popular adversarial attacks and
defenses proposed in the literature, which form the basis of our
evaluations and are necessary for understanding our proposed
defense mechanism. We only focus on adversarial examples
in the domain of image classification, although adversarial
examples can be created for different tasks such as object
recognition [13] and semantic segmentation [14]. In addition,
upsample techniques and input transformation methods are
explored in the literature, which are the underlying mechanism
of our proposed defense.
A. Attack Algorithms
Depending on the adversary’s knowledge regarding the
model under attack, strategies can be categorised as gradient-
based attacks (white-box) or gradient-free attacks (black-box).
Gradient-based attacks are more powerful and usually less
computationally expensive, hence a defense against them is
practically more meaningful. We use gradient-based attacks to
train and test our defense strategy.
Fast Gradient Signed Method (FGSM): This attack is
a single step attack introduced by Goodfellow et al. [15]
3and one of the first adversarial attacks mentioned in the
literature. In Eq. (1), xadv is the adversarial image and xbenign
is the original image. In the cost function J(θ, xbenign, y)), θ
represents the network parameters. Moreover,  is used to scale
the noise and is usually a small number. A sign function is
applied to the gradients of the loss with respect to the input
image to compute the final perturbation.
xadv = xbenign + ε ∗ sign(∇xbenignJ(θ, xbenign, y) (1)
Basic Iterative Method (BIM): This attack is an extension
of FGSM, where α is the amount of perturbation added in each
iteration. In addition, Kurakin et al. [6] used a clip function to
reduce the impact of large changes on each pixel. Usually the
clip function has a range between [0,1] or [0,255] for images.
xadvn+1 = clipx
{
xadvn + α ∗ sign(∇xJ(xadvn , y))
}
(2)
Iterative Least-Likely Class Method (ILLC): This method
is similar to BIM. However, instead of using a true label to
optimize the cost function it uses the ‘least-likely’ label. In
general, there are untargeted and targeted adversarial attacks.
An untargeted attack aims to find an adversarial image that
makes a DNN misclassify an image to any incorrect label.
On the other hand, targeted attacks misclassify an image to
a specific label. ILLC works as a targeted attack using the
least-likely label. In order to perform a targeted attack it is
necessary to change the sign as shown in Eq. 3.
xadvn+1 = clipx
{
xadvn − α ∗ sign(∇xJ(xadvn , yLL))
}
(3)
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD): A stronger iterative
version of FGSM is the PGD attack, which is considered one
of the strongest attacks and it is used as a benchmark to
measure the robustness of many defenses in the literature [16].
Carlini and Wagner (C&W): Carlini and Wagner intro-
duced three attacks in response to one of the first adversarial
defenses in the literature called Defensive distillation [17].
These attacks are hardly noticeable by humans, given that
they constrain the Lp-norm. C&W attacks are shown to be
highly effective against defensive distillation and other types
of defenses. C&W attack that is constrained by L2 norm is
considered one of the strongest attacks in the literature [18],
however, this attack can be computationally expensive, often
requiring thousands of iterations to calculate an adversarial
image.
Decoupling Direction and Norm (DDN): The DDN attack
is an efficient method that was introduced by Rony et al.
[18]. DDN optimizes the number of iterations needed while
achieving state-of-the-art results, even comparable to C&W L2
constrained attacks.
B. defenses
Recently, a number of studies have explored ideas to make
DNNs more robust against adversarial attacks. Many of those
defense methods are still unable to achieve true robustness
to all adversarial inputs. Currently, the most effective defense
strategies modify the DNN training process to improve
robustness against adversarial examples [19]. However, they
are trained to defend against specific attacks, limiting their
real-world applications. In contrast, there is another research
line which aims to be attack and model agnostic. This line
preprocesses the images instead of modifying models or
applying specific defenses to them. In general, adversarial
defenses can be broken down into three categories: defenses
implemented in the training process [20], [21], [22], defenses
that are applied as an image denoising operation [23], [8],
and finally architectured design elements or activations that
make DNNs more robust, such as JumpReLu [4]. Below
we describe some of the defenses with respect to these
three categories, however, our main focus in this paper are
preprocessing methods and these form the underlying concept
that we use in our defense.
1) Adversarial Training: The aim of adversarial training
is to increase the DNN’s robustness by adding adversarial
images to the training set [15], [24], [19]. These methods
effectively enhance robustness against adversarial attacks,
but they lack generalisation to unknown attacks [5]. Many
different techniques to generate adversarial examples can
be applied for data augmentation. Training the model with
the original data and the augmented data might increase the
DNN’s robustness. However, as demonstrated in [25] and
[26], this defense is not robust to black-box attacks.
2) Image Denoising: The approach of pre-processing
input examples to remove adversarial perturbations has the
advantage of being model-agnostic, and it can be used with
any other defense strategies. Bhagoji et al. [27] proposed
a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) method on images
to reduce their dimentionality and therefore reduce noise.
Alternatively, Das et el. [28] proposed leveraging JPEG
compression as a pre-processing step for adversarial defenses.
Pixel Deflection: Some defenses instead of trying to
remove the adversarial patterns on an image aim to corrupt
the perturbation by adding noise. Additive noise is the main
idea behind some defenses such as the pixel deflection
defense [9].
Barrage of Random Transformations (BaRT): There
have been many attempts to use single input transformations
aiming to remove adversarial patterns in images. Some of the
methods proposed in the literature include Feature Squeezing
[29], Blurring filters [30] and JPEG Compression [31], [10],
which are considered weak defenses given that they do not
stand against strong attacks with a significant perturbation. He
et al. showed that combining weak defenses does not create
a stronger defense [32]. However, Raff et al. demonstrated
that randomly selecting transformations from a big pool of
transformations into a single barrage (BaRT) is a defense
capable of resisting the strongest attacks such as PGD [23].
In the BaRT implementation, 25 different transformations are
available to randomly select from that pool. The parameters
for every transformation are selected randomly as well as
the order k of the number of transformations selected. Then,
once it is combined in a single pipeline the transformations
are applied sequentially.
3) Retrofit defenses: Adversarial training requires re-
training a DNN, which can be sometimes computationally
expensive. Alternatively, there is a line of research which tries
4to make changes to the architecture of a DNN at inference time
by modifying or activating different functions. For example,
Erichson et al. [4] proposed a simple and inexpensive strategy
by introducing the new activation function JumpReLU. This
activation function uses a ReLU activation and uses a hyper-
parameter at validation time to control the jump size. They
demonstrated empirically that this activation function increases
model robustness, protecting against adversarial attacks with
high levels of perturbations in MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets.
C. Up-sampling Networks
Up-sampling refers to any technique that converts a low res-
olution image to a higher resolution image [33]. Up-sampling
Networks are used for different computer vision problems such
as super-resolution, denoising and image inpainting. For our
defense architecture we took inspiration from techniques used
in super-resolution, U-Net architectures and Auto-encoders.
The concepts below provide the key to understand our defense.
Super-resolution: Super-resolution aims to restore high-
resolution images using one or more low-resolution im-
ages [34]. More formally, given a low-resolution image Ilr ,
the aim of super-resolution is to generate a high resolution
image Ihr , scaled by a factor number f ∈ R, such that
the result of Ihr = Ilr ∗ f is an enhanced image with
better perceptual quality. In general, Ilr is calculated from
Ihr following a downsampling function Ilr = D(Ihr, δ) where
δ represents the parameters for the downsampling function
D [35]. Super-resolution has been around for decades [36],
and many approaches have been tried from sparse coding
[37] to deep learning methods [38]. Having a wide range of
applications such as medical imaging [39] and surveillance
[40], super-resolution is an important processing technique in
computer vision for enhancing images. Some super-resolution
techniques assume there are multiple low-resolution images
available from the same scene with different perspectives [41].
In contrast, single image super-resolution (SISR) learns to
recover high resolution images from a single low-resolution
image.
Pixel-Shuffle Pixel-shuffle [42] is described as an efficient
sub-pixel convolution layer that learns an array of upsample
filters mapping low resolution images into the high resolution
output. This allows this layer to learn more complex filters than
previous techniques such as bicubic upscale while being an
order of magnitude faster than other CNN-based approaches.
U-Net architecture Another type of upscaling operation
occurs in Autoencoders [43] or architectures such as UNet
[44]. In these architectures, an image is downscaled and
encoded in a vector or bottleneck. From that bottleneck the
next part of the architecture scales up and passes the features
through learnable filters. UNet architectures differ from
traditional Autoencoders by using skip connections from the
downsampling side across the upscaling network.
IV. PERTURBATIONS IN Y-CHANNEL
Adversarial perturbations are usually computed in the RGB
color space. However, there are benefits to using different color
spaces in regards to adversarial attacks and defenses in DNNs.
For example, YCbCr conveniently separates the luma channel
Y from chroma channels Cb and Cr. The JPEG compression
algorithm uses YCbCr color space in its compression process
reducing the color of an image in a process called Chroma
Subsampling [45] while retaining information from the Y-
channel, which is considered more âA˘ŸrelevantâA˘Z´ to human
perception. This comes from the fact that the Y-channel pro-
vides more shape and texture related information than the other
two channels which are focused on color (See Fig. 1). Recent
research also suggests that ImageNet-trained CNNs are biased
towards texture [46], and contrary to some common beliefs,
texture is more important for object recognition classifiers than
other image elements such as color. Moreover, adversarial
attacks are optimization problems that usually constrain the
amount of perturbation to make adversarial images impercep-
tible for the human eye. These attacks try to find the most
efficient way to allocate perturbations in an image with the
least amount of perturbation. If shape and texture features are
more relevant for ImageNet-based CNNs, it also means that
perturbing these features should be more efficient. Therefore,
if we use YCbCr color space, more perturbation should be
concentrated in the Y-channel rather than in the color channels
Cb and Cr. On the contrary, given that the shape and texture
features are spread equally in the RGB color space, there
should be a similar amount of perturbation in each channel
for this color space.
To validate the above claims, we perform an experiment on
5000 randomly selected images from the ImageNet validation
dataset and generate adversarial images using attacks FGSM,
PGD and DDN with different levels of perturbations ranging
between  = 0.01 and  = 0.04. Next, we calculate the
per channel `2 difference between the original image and the
adversarial image in the YCbCr and RGB color spaces.
There are several standards for YCbCr conversion. We
focus on the standard specified in JFIF version 1.02 [47] and
according to it, channels Y, Cb , and Cr have a full range
[0,255]. Equations 4 and 5 show the relationship between
RGB and YCbCr.
Y = 0 + (0.299R) + (0.587G) + (0.114B)
Cb = 128 − (0.168736R) − (0.331264G) + (0.5B)
Cr = 128 + (0.5R) − (0.418688G) − (0.081312B)
(4)
R = Y + 1.402(Cr − 128)
G = Y − 0.344136(Cb − 128) − 0.714136(Cr − 128)
B = Y + 1.772(Cb − 128)
(5)
Our results in Table I corroborates the intuition presented
above and show that images on the RGB space have a very
similar amount of perturbation in each channel. However, in
the YCbCr color space, the Y-channel consistently presents
more perturbation than the Cb and Cr channels. We also
illustrate this fact qualitatively in Figure 1. Whereas Table I
shows the average values, we confirmed that the Y-channel
distance was significantly higher than the Cb and Cr channels
for each one of the 5000 images.
Since perturbations are allocated more strongly in the Y-
channel and this channel contains more relevant features, we
propose a method for removing perturbations only from the
5TABLE I: Color space perturbations: This table shows the results for a subset of 5000 images from the ImageNet validation dataset (Dataset-2. See Table II). In this table, we take
the average of the difference between original images and their adversarial versions under adversarial attacks FGSM, PGD and DDN with epsilon values between =0.01 and =0.04.
FGSM PGD DDN
MODELS e=0.01 e=0.02 e=0.04 e=0.01 e=0.02 e=0.04 n=20 n=40 n=60
YCbCr Y Cb Cr Y Cb Cr Y Cb Cr Y Cb Cr Y Cb Cr Y Cb Cr Y Cb Cr Y Cb Cr Y Cb Cr
Vgg16 6.30 4.19 4.15 7.48 4.76 4.68 8.51 5.22 5.11 6.60 4.40 4.46 7.95 5.13 5.19 9.26 5.80 5.94 2.89 1.92 2.09 2.72 1.83 1.00 2.51 1.72 1.89
Resnet50 6.40 4.24 4.20 7.58 4.78 4.70 8.60 5.20 5.10 6.50 4.40 4.52 7.86 5.16 5.21 9.09 5.98 6.10 2.89 1.92 2.09 2.72 1.83 2.00 2.51 1.72 1.89
Densenet121 6.40 4.27 4.30 7.13 4.85 4.88 8.10 5.33 5.35 6.30 4.40 4.52 7.73 5.19 5.28 9.02 6.01 6.16 2.89 1.92 2.09 2.72 1.83 2.10 2.18 1.54 1.74
RGB R G B R G B R G B R G B R G B R G B R G B R G B R G B
Vgg16 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.51 0.51 0.51 1.02 1.02 1.02 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
Resnet50 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.51 0.51 0.51 1.01 1.01 1.02 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
Densenet121 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.51 0.51 0.51 1.01 1.01 1.02 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
Y-channel in an effort to make existing CNN models robust to
adversarial attacks while maintaining their accuracies on clean
images.
V. PROPOSED APPROACH
The aim of our proposed approach is achieve model-
agnostic defense by preprocessing an input image and then
reconstructing it with an Upsampling Network while removing
adversarial patterns. Our defense consists of a single transfor-
mation that uses a ResNet model [48] pretrained on ImageNet
dataset to extract features from its internal layers. Our archi-
tecture takes inspiration from U-Net [44] and Dynamic U-
Nets proposed by the FastAI research team [49]. Similar to U-
Net architecture, skip connections are used to concatenate the
features from the encoder layers to the upsampling network.
However, it differs from traditional autoencoders by not using
a bottleneck, which is essential for these architectures. Instead
of training a decoder from scratch, a pretrained ResNet18
model is used to extract meaningful features and add them to
the main Upsample Network. Given that meaningful features
are passed directly from the auxiliary network to our DNN at
different stages, the use of a bottleneck becomes redundant.
ResNet18 is the shallowest version from the original pro-
posed ResNet architectures. However, we can extract useful
feature maps from their internal layers. While using deeper
architectures such as ResNet-101 or ResNet-152 might be
beneficial, providing more interesting and robust features, it
will also increase the number of parameters and computational
time to process each image, which is not desirable. Therefore,
we demonstrate that using a shallow ResNet backbone is
enough to create a strong defense. In addition, as part of
the preparation to train the network images, our network
adds random noise to every input image in the training
and evaluation step. As mentioned in Section III-B, some
defenses have used additive random noise as part of their
approach, and recent research suggests that additive random
noise can significantly improve robustness of a model [50].
Moreover, the Upsampling Network selectively creates high
frequency components and recovers the components, removing
at the same time adversarial perturbations. Once the image
is preprocessed using the Upsampling model, the new image
version can be passed to different models.
A. Implementation Details
We implemented our defense architecture using the Python
library Pytorch [51]. Moreover, we used Advertorch [52]
to create adversarial images for three different architectures
Vgg16 [53], ResNet50 [48], and DenseNet121 [54]. Those
models have unique architecture mechanisms and differ in the
number of layers, which makes them a good benchmark to
test our defense with contrasting models. For L∞ constrained
attacks such as FGSM and PGD, we use  values of 0.01,
0.02 and 0.04 for images with values in the range [0,1]. In
the case of DDN attack, instead of  , we use the number of
iterations n as the hyper-parameter, with values 20, 40, and 60.
For the training process, given that we are borrowing
features from a pretrained model such as ResNet18, we only
used the ImageNet validation dataset that contains 50000
images and divided it into two subsets. We used 40000 images
for training our defense and 10000 images for validation.
In the training process, before processing each batch, we
randomly selected between FGSM and PGD attack as well
as random perturbations ranging from  = 0 to  = 0.05 and
applied the attacks to each batch. In addition, we used Mean
Square Error loss, and Adam as an optimizer with learning
rate 0.0001. We trained our defense for 15 epochs. Each epoch
took just over 5 hours in total using a GeForce RTX 2080 ti
GPU. The code for our defense and other useful scripts will
be available at http://www.github.com/elcronos/ResUpNet.
B. ResUpNet Architecture
Figure 2 illustrates the architecture used for the defense
mechanism. In this architecture, we use Residual Blocks
that contain Convolution layers, Batch Normalization and
ReLU activations. These Residual Blocks are then used in
the Upsample Blocks which introduces a PixelShuffle layer
at the end of the block for the upsampling operation.
Our approach follows two streams. In the first stream,
the input image in the RGB space is processed by the ResNet
Backbone. In this step, we extract the features from four
different layers and save them in memory. In the second
stream, the input image is converted from RGB space to
YCbCr space. The Y-channel is processed while Cb and Cr
channels remain unchanged. Continuing with the process,
random noise is added to the Y-channel signal and then
passed through a Convolutional layer. Many defenses have
used noise injection as part of their defense strategy and
recent research suggests that it can improve DDNs robustness
against adversarial attacks for white-box and black-box
attacks [55] [56]. Even though our defense focus is on
white-box attacks, some researchers have demonstrated the
effectiveness of using randomization in defenses, which can
be specially effective against black-box attacks hardening
6Fig. 3: The figure illustrates defenses such as Pixel Deflection, BaRT k=5, BaRT k=10 and ResUpNet (ours) under FGSM, PGD and DDN attacks. These defenses are evaluated
using Dataset-1 and Worst in accordance with Table II. Accuracy for each defense is measure under different values of perturbation  = 0.01,  = 0.02,  = 0.04. Given that DDN
attack works differently to generate adversarial images, instead of using  , a number of iterations n with parameters n = 60, n = 40 and n = 20 is used. For both datasets under
evaluation, Top-1 and Top-5 accuracy are evaluated for models Vgg16, ResNet50 and DenseNet121.
the process of estimating the gradients of our defense
[57], [58], [11]. After this, Upsample Blocks are used with
a scale factor = 2 to scale up the Y-channel. In the process,
the data extracted from the ResNet Backbone is shared
with those Upsample Blocks using skip connections. Finally,
the resulting recovered Y-channel is concatenated with the
unchanged Cb and Cr channels and the image is converted
back to RGB.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
We perform two types of experiments. In the first one, we
show results of our ResUpNet. In the second experiment, we
show that by focusing perturbations in the Y-channel, we can
achieve higher fooling rates for the same attack types and with
the same value of perturbations.
A. Removing Perturbations in the Y-channel
We tested our defense considering L2 and L∞ constrained
attacks. The first attack is the well-known one-step attack
FGSM. To compare the effect of one-step attacks and iterative
attacks, we tested the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack
as well, which is considered a strong attack. Additionally, from
the L2 constrained norm attacks, we used DDN instead of
the C&W attack. DDN provides state-of-the-art attacks while
converging much faster and with fewer iterations than the
C&W attack. For the implementation of these attacks, we used
the Advertorch library [52] which integrates seemlessly with
Pytorch.
Initially, we selected 5 subsets of 5000 mutually exclusive
images from the ImageNet validation dataset (See Table II).
Akhtar et al. [59] argue that evaluating defense mechanisms
on already misclassified images is not meaningful and those
TABLE II: Accuracy of Datasets with no defense: Datasets D-(1-5) get very similar
results with a very small standard deviation between them. However, dataset ‘Best’
consistently gets better results than the other 5 randomly selected datasets while dataset
‘Worst’ has the lowest performance.
MODEL CLEAN FGSM PGD DDN
DATASETS 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 20 40 60
Dataset 1
vgg16 71.8 4.1 4.2 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.4 0.9 0.8
resnet50 75.9 7.4 7.6 9.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.1
densenet 121 74.6 4.2 4.3 5.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1
Dataset 2
vgg16 70.0 4.0 3.7 4.5 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.3 0.1 0.1
resnet50 74.8 6.7 6.3 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1
densenet 121 73.0 3.4 3.4 4.9 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.1
Dataset 3
vgg16 71.8 4.7 4.3 4.8 0.7 0.5 0.2 1.4 1.1 1.0
resnet50 76.3 7.8 7.6 9.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.2
densenet 121 74.6 4.0 3.7 5.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1
Dataset 4
vgg16 71.0 4.5 4.4 5.2 1.0 0.7 0.4 1.6 1.3 1.2
resnet50 76.3 8.0 8.0 9.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.1
densenet 121 74.2 4.1 4.0 5.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1
Dataset 5
vgg16 71.6 4.5 4.4 4.8 0.7 0.4 0.3 1.5 1.2 1.0
resnet50 77.0 7.0 7.5 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0
densenet 121 74.7 4.1 3.8 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1
Best
vgg16 94.9 11.2 10.7 11.8 1.6 1.2 0.7 3.5 2.5 2.1
resnet50 96.9 18.4 17.7 22.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.5 0.2
densenet 121 96.4 9.9 9.5 13.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.2
Worst
vgg16 67.5 2.1 2.0 2.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1
resnet50 73.7 4.8 4.9 5.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0
densenet 121 70.9 2.0 1.9 2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
images should not be considered for evaluation since an
attack on a misclassified image is considered successful
by default and this could mislead the interpretation of the
results. For that reason, some researchers have used a subset
on ImageNet that guarantees a 100% success rate, or greater
than 80% on clean images. We observed in Table II that
the 5 randomly selected datasets have accuracies on clean
images around 70% with a standard deviation close to 1%.
However, we wanted to identify a subset that has greater
than 80% accuracy on clean images. We found that inside
the 50000 images in the ImageNet validation dataset, there
is a subset of images that performs considerably better on
clean images, specially under the FGSM attack, and another
7dataset that performs worse than the 5 randomly selected sets.
In the case of the best scenario, the accuracy for FGSM attack
without any defense is around 20% higher than the rest of the
datasets. We also observed that the reported accuracy under
an FGSM attack is significantly higher as well, indicating
that this particular subset of images seems to be more robust
under weak attacks (excluding PGD and DDN). Using the
best dataset, which has better initial accuracies on clean
images without defenses, could be misleading and it is
not a fair representation of the ImageNet dataset. For this
reason, we decided to arbitrarily select any of the 5 datasets
which have a very low standard deviation between them.
We selected Dataset 1. All the indices from each subset of
images we created, including the Best and Worst scenarios
are in our Github Repository. This facilitates future research
to make comparisons with the same datasets.
Figure 3 shows quantitative results comparing our defense
ResUpNet with other input transformation defenses,
including the state-of-the-art defense BaRT with parameters
k=5 transformations and k=10 transformations. We used
‘Dataset-1’ and ‘Worst’ (See Table II) to evaluate those
defenses against FGSM, PGD and DDN attack using different
levels of perturbations. While Pixel Deflection defense seems
to outperform the accuracy compared to other defenses on
clean images, it performs poorly against adversarial attacks.
Our results also show that ResUpNet performs better or
as good as the two BaRT defenses in many cases: all the
variations of n’s for DDN attack and the other attacks with
 = 0.01 and  = 0.02 are consistently better than the other
defenses for ‘Dataset-1’ and ‘Worst’, both in Top-1 and
Top-5 accuracy metrics. However, results are not consistent
on the  = 0.04 cases. Despite this, our defense has the best
trade-off between accuracy on clean images and recovery of
accuracy under adversarial attacks.
B. Perturbing only the Y-Channel
TABLE III: Y Attack: Attacks FGSM, PGD and our versions FGSM-Y and PGD-Y
are evaluated using small values for  . The values on the table show the percentage of
success attack for different models. For this experiment, we used ‘Dataset-5’ (See Table
II)
Attack Models  =0.002  =0.003  =0.004  =0.005  =0.01
FGSM
Vgg 77.5 85.8 89.4 93.7 93.7
ResNet 70.5 79.6 84.6 86.8 90.9
DenseNet 78.0 84.8 89.3 91.2 94.5
FGSM-Y
Vgg 88.3 96.5 98.1 98.7 100.0
ResNet 81.6 94.2 97.9 99.1 100.0
DenseNet 83.4 95.4 99.0 99.5 100.0
PGD
Vgg 69.5 80.2 85.8 89.0 93.5
ResNet 63.0 73.8 80.1 84.1 90.6
DenseNet 68.7 78.8 85.0 88.4 94.1
PGD-Y
Vgg 86.0 95.9 98.0 98.5 100.0
ResNet 78.6 93.6 97.7 99.0 100.0
DenseNet 80.4 94.4 98.5 99.5 100.0
Standard attacks such as FGSM and PGD allocates more
perturbation in the Y channel. To optimize further those at-
tacks, it is possible to create an iterative process selecting only
perturbations in the Y-channel and discarding the perturbation
in Cb and Cr, hence, we can reduce the amount of perturbation
needed for a successful attack. For this experiment, we used
FGSM and PGD attacks selecting only the perturbations on
the Y-channel. In each iteration of our Y Attack, we use
a small constant α=0.0001 and calculate the perturbation.
Then, the adversarial image, usually in RGB color space, is
converted to YCbCr using Eq. 4. The original image is also
converted to YCbCr and its Y channel values are replaced by
the adversarial Y channel. The partially perturbed image is
then converted back to RGB and the process is repeated until
obtaining an adversarial image constrained by α, a maximum
perturbation  and maximum number of iterations. Table III
show the comparison between our Y Attack optimization for
FGSM and PGD and the original attacks. We call FGSM-Y
and PGD-Y the corresponding version of the attack with our
Y Attack optimization. For both attacks FGSMI-Y and PGD-
Y, we achieve better success rates with less perturbations than
the original attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
We introduced a ResUpNet defense, which achieves state-
of-the-art results in the category of input transformation
defenses. We demonstrate that little training is needed to
reconstruct images from adversarial images when we borrow
features from pretrained ResNet backbones. Additionally, we
demonstrated for the first time that adversarial images on
average show much more perturbation concentration in the
Y-channel of YCbCr color space and that denoising the Y-
channel alone is sufficient to defend from strong attacks
such as PGD and DDN. Previous input transformation based
defenses in the literature tried to remove adversarial pertur-
bations from the 3 channels in the RGB space. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first adversarial defense that
focuses on the removal of perturbations in a single channel
and is able to achieve state-of-the-art results while retaining a
good ratio between accuracy on clean images and robustness
against adversarial images. Our defense being model-agnostic
is able to generalize well across different models with different
architectures and layers and can potentially be combined
with other defenses to improve its effectiveness. In addition,
existent attacks could benefit from this insight as well and
try to focus on the Y perturbations to reduce the amount of
perturbations needed for a successful attack.
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